Financial Statements – How To Detect A Fraud

Financial Shenanigans, by Howard M. Schilit

Photograph of Schilit
Howard Schilit

Financial Shenanigans

It is common for leveraged buyout practitioners to have the accounts of companies they are investigating scrutinized by specialized departments of audit firms.

The goal, among others, is to determine (i) the Adjusted EBITDA figure on which to apply the appropriate EV/EBITDA multiple (“quality of earnings”) and (ii) the Adjusted Net Debt (Cash) to deduct from (add to) Enterprise Value to get to Equity Value (“quality of debt”).

In bullish markets and/or competitive auctions, being too rigorous with these adjustments often means losing the deal, which may cause newbies to wonder why we bother with these analyses in the first place.

But far worse than losing a deal is winning one only to discover shortly after that the figures you based your offer on vastly overestimate the earnings power of the business or underestimate its liabilities, which may lead to painful restructuring and permanent loss of capital.

I came across Financial Shenanigans by Howard M. Schilit (co-authored by Jeremy Perler and Yoni Engelhart) as the book was recommended by none other than legendary investor and businessman Warren Buffett.

The book highlights the most common types of manipulation tricks (“shenanigans”) that unscrupulous managers use to give a distorted picture of earnings, cash flows and key metrics, either in a standalone context or via acquisitions. It also lists the warning signs that investors should consider as a likely breeding ground for such shenanigans. And lastly, it provides a useful framework to analyze financial statements and advises investors to scrutinize the P&L, the balance sheet and the cash flow statement together in a holistic fashion.

Breeding grounds for shenanigans

Below are breeding grounds that investors should be wary of:

  1. Absence of checks and balances within senior management
    • Lack of strong, confident and ethical members
    • Powerful and bullying CEO
    • Small group of family and friends holding key executive positions
    • Senior executives who push for winning at all costs
    • Boastful or promotional management
    • Extended streak of meeting or exceeding Wall Street expectations
  2. Boards lacking competence or independence
    • Inappropriate or inadequately prepared board members
    • Failure to challenge management on related-party transactions
    • Failure to challenge management on inappropriate compensation plans
  3. Auditors lacking objectivity and the appearance of independence
    • Too long and close a relationship
    • Incompetent auditors
  4. Lack of regulatory scrutiny before going public

Motivations for shenanigans

Below are common motivations of top management to resort to financial shenanigans:

  1. Meet results expectations.
  2. Cover up a deterioration of the business.
  3. Smooth results to please investors.
  4. Meet covenant obligations.
  5. Prop up the share price to exercise stock options.
  6. Trigger bonus payments.

Earnings manipulation shenanigans

Below are seven kinds of earnings manipulation tricks:

Recording revenue too soon

  • Recording revenue before completing material obligations under the contract. This includes backdating or forging sales contracts, stretching out the quarter end date to record extra sales, recognizing revenue at the point of shipment rather than delivery, and treating rebates to customers as an operating expense rather than a reduction of sales.
  • Recording revenue far in excess of work completed on the contract. This applies to products and services delivered over an extended period of time and where management, which has a fair degree of discretion on the matter, records more revenues than warranted. Such issues may notably arise with (i) construction or production contracts spanning over several fiscal years and recorded using percentage-of-completion accounting (where revenues are recognized based on the estimated percentage of total project costs incurred), (ii) capital leases (where a large portion of future lease payments can be recognized upfront using present value estimates), (iii) long-term arrangements with multiple bundled deliverables (where the split of value between the various deliverables is based on assumptions), and (iv) utility contracts recorded using mark-to-market accounting (where management can recognize the whole “fair value” upfront, and markups or markdowns subsequently). Warning signs include (i) changing the revenue recognition policy to record revenue sooner, (ii) changing the value split among deliverables forming part of a bundle in order to “front-end” revenues, (iii) receivables increasing faster than sales (i.e. a lengthening DSO), especially long-term receivables and unbilled receivables, (iv) cash flow from operations materially lagging behind net income, (v) selecting inappropriately low discount rates for present value estimates, and (vi) using a revenue recognition policy intended for a different industry (e.g. percentage of completion for companies with short production cycles, mark to market for utility companies).
  • Recording revenue before the buyer’s final acceptance of the product. Tricks include recording revenue (i) before shipment of the product (bill-and-hold transactions at the request of the seller), (ii) after shipment, but to someone other than the buyer or end-user (e.g. to company-owned facilities, to consignees, to distributors) or (iii) after shipment, but while the buyer can still void the sale (e.g. incorrect or incomplete order, right order but received too early or still subject to a “right of return”). Warning signs include (i) using bill-and-hold transactions initiated by the seller (e.g. early purchase in exchange for large discounts and payment delays), (ii) using consignment arrangements (where the company ships to a consignee tasked with finding a buyer), (iii) switching from a sell-through (products sold to the end user) to a sell-in (products sold to the distributor) revenue recognition policy to hide an operational deterioration, (iv) deliberately shipping incorrect or incomplete products, shipping them early or recording revenue before the lapse of the right of return and (v) an increasing DSO.
  • Recording revenue when the buyer’s payment remains uncertain or unnecessary. Tricks include (i) recording revenue before customers secure the necessary financing, (ii) changing the revenue recognition by relaxing the assessment of customers’ ability to pay and (iii) inducing sales by allowing an exceptionally long time to pay (watch for seller-provided financing, offer of extended or flexible payment terms, jump in DSO).

All these tricks end up shifting future-period revenues to an earlier period. Beware as companies getting caught must restate opening retained earnings but will continue to record future revenues, thus ending up recording more revenues than warranted.

Recording bogus revenue

  • Recording revenue from transactions that lack economic substance. Tricks include (i) financing disguised as insurance contracts (earnings shortfalls covered by retroactive insurance with insurance premiums paid subsequently), (ii) barter transactions, especially with related parties, and (iii) recording revenues from non-binding sales to distributors or from sales in which the company pays for its customers’ purchases (normally resulting in bulging receivables).
  • Recording revenue from transactions that lack a reasonable arm’s-length process. Tricks include recording bogus revenues (i) with related-party customers and JV partners, (ii) with parent companies, (iii) with parties that are about to merge (e.g. sale of equipment to a target company paid for by an increase in purchase price), (iv) involving two-way transactions.
  • Recording revenue on receipts from non-revenue-producing transactions. Tricks include inappropriately classifying as revenues (i) cash received from the drawdown of loans, (ii) advances from a JV partner (e.g. to fund research), (iii) rebates from vendors (which should instead reduce the value of the purchased inventories)
  • Recording revenue from appropriate transactions, but at inflated amounts. Tricks include (i) using an inappropriate methodology to recognize revenue and (ii) grossing up revenue to make a company appear larger.
  • Companies should record revenue only when (1) evidence of an arrangement exists, (2) delivery of the product or services has occurred, (3) the price is fixed or determinable, and (4) payment is reasonably assured.

Boosting income using one-time or unsustainable activities

  • Boosting income using one-time events. Tricks include (i) classifying a disposal gain as a reduction of expenses, (ii) turning the sale of a business into a recurring revenue stream when commingling the sale of a business with the sale of product, by reducing the disposal price and inflating product prices (note: be sure to review both parties’ disclosure to grasp the true economics), (iii) changing accounting policies to accelerate the recognition of income (e.g. recognizing unused prepaid card balances as income sooner).
  • Boosting income through misleading classifications. Tricks include (i) shifting normal expenses below the line (e.g. recording restructuring expenses every year, shifting losses to discontinued operations), (ii) shifting non-operating or nonrecurring income above the line (e.g. one-time gain from selling a business, accounting for interest income from franchisees or share of profits from JVs as revenue), (iii) quirks of consolidation accounting (the full operating income appears above the line, while minority interests are recorded below the line) and (iv) offloading losses to or uploading income from the balance sheet (e.g. asserting influence in affiliates when their results are strong to record their pro rata share of earnings and asserting lack of influence when affiliates are struggling to avoid recording losses and simply adjusting the balance sheet account to fair value, creating nonconsolidated partnerships to hide startup losses).

Shifting current expenses to a later period

  • Excessively capitalizing normal operating expenses. Tricks include (i) capitalizing routine operating expenses (e.g. lease line costs for telecom carriers, marketing and solicitation costs, subscriber acquisition costs), (ii) unsustainable earnings boosts from adopting new accounting rules, (iii) capitalizing permissible items, but in too great an amount (e.g. by claiming technical feasibility too early), Warning signs include (i) unwarranted improvement in profit margins, (ii) large jump in certain assets, (iii) big unexpected declines in FCF, (iv) unexpected increases in capex, (v) changes in policy from expensing to capitalizing costs, (vi) earnings boosts after adopting new accounting rules, (vii) unusual asset accounts on the balance sheet, (viii) different capitalizing policies within the same industry, (ix) increased rate of software capitalization (as a % of total capex or total software development costs), (x) growing advances or prepayments. Beware as improper capitalization of costs also inflates operating cash flow.
  • Amortizing costs too slowly. Tricks include (i) stretching out the amortization or depreciation period (to camouflage a deterioration of business), (ii) depreciating fixed assets too slowly (especially in industries experiencing rapid technological changes), (iii) failing to adjust loan premium amortization when borrowers pay off their loans quicker than anticipated and (iv) amortizing inventory costs too slowly (e.g. in film production or in the aerospace industry).
  • Failing to write down assets with impaired value. Tricks include (i) failing to write down impaired plant assets (and instead cleaning house with big restructuring charges), (ii) failing to write off excess or obsolete inventory (subject to management discretion) and (iii) pretending an inventory buildup had been planned to anticipate increased demand (be suspicious if DIO has increased and there was no mention of this strategy before and/or if inventory growth exceeds expected sales growth).
  • Failing to record expenses for uncollectible receivables and devalued investments. Tricks include (i) failing to adequately reserve for uncollectible customer receivables (watch for a drop in allowance for doubtful accounts and/or a rise in receivables), (ii) inappropriately reversing bad debts expense, (iii) failing to adequately reserve for credit losses (watch for loan loss reserves decline relative to bad loans, be cautious when companies loan money to their own customers), (iv) failing to write down impaired investments (watch for companies failing to take impairment losses during market downturns).
  • Assets fall into two categories: (i) those that are expected to produce a future benefit (inventory, equipment, prepaid insurance), (ii) those that are ultimately expected to be exchanged for another asset such as cash (receivables, investments). The former are close cousins of expenses, the key distinction being timing.

Employing other techniques to hide expenses or losses

  • Failing to record an expense at the appropriate amount from a current transaction. Tricks include (i) failing to record invoices from vendors received late in the period or to accrue other end-of-period expenses (e.g. payroll tax on bonuses), (ii) receiving sham upfront rebates from suppliers (note: always challenge cash receipts from vendors), (iii) failing to properly account for stock option backdating expense (the king of shenanigans) and (iv) failing to record a portion of an expense related to a transaction.
  • Failing to record an expense for a necessary accrual or reversing a past expense. Tricks include (i) improperly accounting for warranty expenses, (ii) failing to account for bonus accruals, (iii) failing to account for loss contingencies although the loss is probable and can be reasonably estimated, (iv) failing to disclose off-balance sheet commitments.
  • Failing to record or reducing expenses by using aggressive accounting assumptions. Tricks include (i) understating pension expenses (e.g. aggressive return assumptions, increasing rates of return, increasing life expectancy, changes in discount rates, compensation inflation rates or measurement dates), (ii) manipulating the residual value of leases and (iii) tweaking self-insurance assumptions.
  • Reducing expenses by releasing bogus reserves from previous charges, e.g. restructuring and other “cookie jar” reserves. Watch for earnings boosts when a company misses its bonus targets and monitor soft liability accounts (other current liabilities, accrued expenses).

Shifting current income to a later period

  • Creating reserves and releasing them into income in a later period. Tricks include (i) saving up revenues for a rainy day (deferred or unearned revenue) and (ii) shifting windfall gains to future periods by storing them into reserves.
  • Smoothing income by improperly accounting for derivatives. Tricks include (i) holding back windfall gains from hedging (by classifying them as effective) to release them if needed to smooth earnings, (ii) using speculative ineffective hedges (that produce gains well in excess of the loss in the underlying asset or liability, i.e. over hedging, or that move in the same direction). Note: change in value on ineffective hedges should be recognized as current-period income while change in value of effective hedges do not affect earnings.
  • Creating reserves in conjunction with an acquisition and releasing them into income in a later period. The trick consists of instructing the target company to hold back revenue until after the merger closes. Watch for lower revenue at a target company before the acquisition closes.
  • Recording current-period sales in a later period. The trick consists, late in a strong period where management has achieved its earnings targets, to stop recording revenues and shift them to the next quarter.

Shifting future expenses to the current period

  • Improperly writing off assets in the current period to avoid expenses in a future period. Tricks include (i) improperly writing off assets (e.g. deferred marketing costs, inventories as obsolete, plant and equipment considered impaired, intangible assets) to inflate future profit margins, while (ii) shifting these accelerated expenses below the line by classifying them as one-time restructuring charges. Be wary of restructuring charges (i) after the hiring of a new CEO: part of their playbook is to announce a streamlining of operations and a large write-down of assets (“big bath”) to appear decisive while enabling higher future profits, (ii) just before an acquisition closes, (iii) which occur with uncommon regularity. Watch for reversal of prior inventory impairment charges. Note: the proper way would be to place costs which represent future long-term benefits on the balance sheet as assets, and shift these costs to expenses when the benefits are received.
  • Improperly recording charges to establish reserves used to reduce future expenses. Tricks include (i) padding restructuring charges during downturns or times of plenty to release them later and (ii) creating cookie jar reserves at the time of an acquisition (restructuring charges, impairment of assets, integration costs). Watch for dramatic improvement in the numbers right after the restructuring period and for companies that create reserves at the time of an acquisition.

Cash flow shenanigans

The cash flow statement

The cash flow statement is organized into three sections, with the operating section usually followed more closely by investors.

  • Operating activities
    • Inflows; customer collections, interest collections, dividend collections
    • Outflows; vendor payments, employee salaries, tax payments, interest payments
  • Investing activities
    • Inflows: investment sales, plant/equipment sales, business disposals
    • Outflows: capital expenditures, investment purchases, property purchases, business acquisitions
  • Financing activities
    • Inflows: bank borrowings, other borrowings
    • Outflows: loan repayments, stock repurchases, dividend payments

Manipulation tricks

Below are four types of cash flow shenanigans, many of which consisting of moving items from one section to the other.

Shifting financing cash inflows to the operating section

  • Recording bogus CFFO from a normal bank borrowing. Tricks include (i) sham sales of inventory to a bank, (ii) recording bogus revenue, (iii) showcasing self-defined cash operating flow metrics and (iv) using complicated off-balance sheet structures.
  • Boosting CFFO by selling receivables before the collection date. These are an unsustainable driver of CFFO growth and can be revealed by (i) sudden cash flow swings, (ii) quarterly and annual filings discussions or (iii) failure to disclose details.
  • Inflating CFFO by faking the sale of receivables, by transferring receivables to a bank for cash but keeping the risk of collection loss or having the bank retain the right to sell them back. Look for (i) disclosure changes in the “risk factors” section and (ii) the provision of less disclosure than in prior periods.

Moving operating cash outflows to other sections

  • Inflating CFFO with boomerang transactions, e.g. recording cash received from customers as an operating inflow and cash paid to the same customers as an investing outflow. Note: in the presence of boomerang transactions, make sure to dig around and understand the true economics of the arrangement.
  • Improperly capitalizing normal operating costs. This does more than embellish earnings, it inflates CFFO as well. Rapidly growing fixed asset accounts or soft asset accounts (e.g. prepaid expenses, other assets) relative to sales may be a sign of agressive capitalization. Create a quarterly common size balance sheet (all assets and liabilities as a % of total assets) to identify assets which are growing faster than the rest and pay attention to Free Cash Flow as well.
  • Recording the purchase of inventory as an investing outflow. Consider differences in accounting policies when comparing competitors. Keep an eye out for companies that purchase goods and lease them to customers, question investing outflows that sound like a normal cost of operations (e.g. acquisition of DVDs for Netflix, purchase of patents and technologies) and look for supplemental cash flow information.
  • Shifting operating cash outflows off the cash flow statement. While most companies fund their pension plans with cash, which reduces cash flows, some have funded them with other assets (e.g. whisky inventories, treasuries).

Inflating operating cash flow using acquisitions or disposals

See acquisition accounting shenanigans.

  • Inheriting operating inflows in a normal business acquisition.
  • Acquiring contracts or customers rather than developing them internally.
  • Boosting CFFO by creatively structuring the sale of a business.

Boosting operating cash flow using unsustainable activities.

  • Paying vendors more slowly. Watch for an increase in DPO (measured in days of COGS), large positive swings in the CF statement, the use of accounts payable financing, swings in other payables accounts (tax, payroll and bonus, pension pal contributions).
  • Collecting from customers more quickly. Growth in CFFO from accelerated collections should be deemed unsustainable. Watch for new disclosures about prepayments, discounts to induce early payments, dramatic improvements in CFFO.
  • Purchasing less inventory. Watch for disclosure about timing of inventory purchases within each quarter.
  • One-time benefits, e.g. litigation settlement proceeds. Note: when you spot a one-time earnings benefit, ask how this affects the CF statement.

Key metrics shenanigans

Questions to ask

It is important to ask the following questions before digging in:

  • What are the best metrics of that specific company’s performance?
  • What are the best metrics that would reveal a deteriorating economic health?
  • Does management highlight, ignore, distort or make up its own version of these metrics?

Types of key metrics

Key metrics can be grouped as:

  • Performance metrics
    • Surrogates for revenue: e.g. subscriber count, load factor, paid clicks, revenue per available room, same store sales, backlog, bookings, average revenue per customer, organic revenue growth.
    • Surrogates for earnings: e.g. pro forma earnings, EBITDA, non-GAAP earnings, constant-currency earnings, organic earnings growth.
    • Surrogates for cash flow: e.g. pro forma operating cash flow, non-GAAP operating cash flow, free cash flow, cash earnings, cash revenue, funds from operations.
  • Economic health metrics
    • Accounts receivable management: investors worry if collection of customer receivables begins to stretch out and thus monitor DSO = accounts receivables / sales x number of days in the period.
    • Inventory management: holding an inventory of undesirable products leads to write-downs, while not having enough of the hot ones leads to missed sales. Investors thus monitor DIO (aka DSI) = inventories / COGS x number of days in the period.
    • Asset strength: the quality or strength of financial assets is key for financial institutions. Investors monitor metrics such as delinquency rates or investment fair value to ensure proper reserves and impairments are recorded.
    • Liquidity and solvency: companies can face serious consequences if their liquidity sources dry up or if they fail to meet their covenants, with the potential for devastating losses for investors. Investors thus monitor threats of credit rating downgrades, cash crunches and covenants issues.

Manipulation tricks

Below are two types of key metrics manipulation shenanigans:

Showcasing misleading metrics that overstate performance

  • Highlighting a misleading metric as a surrogate for revenue. Tricks may be applied to (i) same store sales (“SSS”): compare them to average revenue per store to spot if new stores are beginning to struggle or the company has changed the definition of SSS (changing the length of time before a new store enters the comp base or excluding certain stores based on geography, size, business, remodeling, etc.), (ii) organic growth; look for strange definitions, notably those including spillovers from acquisitions, (iii) headline growth: look for arbitrary exclusions of “non-ongoing” businesses, (iv) ARPU: ensure metrics are calculated in the same way when comparing them across a peer group (what type of revenue? net of promotions and rebates? average calculation?), (v) subscriber additions and churn; watch for change in scope (e.g. inclusion of bulk subscriptions or subscriptions from unconsolidated subsidiaries), (vi) bookings, backlog and book-to-bill: different companies treat cancel label orders, orders in which the quantity purchased is not defined, bookings for longer-term service or construction contracts, contracts with contingencies or extension clauses, bookings on noncore operations, etc., (vii) discontinued reporting of a key metric.
  • Highlighting a misleading metric as a surrogate for earnings. Tricks include (i) inflating EBITDA by excluding maintenance costs, stock compensation expenses, bad debt, employee retention bonuses, routine regulatory charges, (ii) inflating non-GAAP earnings pretending recurring charges are one-time or that one-time gains are recurring and (iii) changing the definition of adjusted earnings,
  • Highlighting a misleading metric as a surrogate for cash flow, e.g. (i) “cash EBITDA” and “cash earnings” as proxies for CFFO while they exclude change in WCR, capital expenses, or cost of rentals where these are considered as depreciation, (ii) confusing non-GAAP cash flow metrics such as “operating cash flows” which may exclude routine items, (iii) “funds from operations” not conforming to NAREIT’s industry standard definition (e.g. including gains from sales of property).

Distorting balance sheet metrics to avoid showing deterioration

  • Distorting accounts receivable metrics to hide revenue problems. Tricks include (i) selling accounts receivable (note: add back sold receivables to calculate DSO), (ii) converting accounts receivable into notes receivable (beware if there is a large drop in DSO following a period of rapid rise), (iii) moving accounts receivable somewhere else on the balance sheet (other receivables), (iv) changing DSO calculations. Note: investors searching for shenanigans should use the ending receivables balance (ending receivables / revenue x days in the period).
  • Distorting inventory metrics to hide profitability problems. Tricks include (i) recording fictitious entries, (ii) failing to record returned products as inventories, (iii) selling inventory to a third party but agreeing to repurchase it, (iv) moving inventory to long-term assets, (v) displaying new metrics such as “in-store” inventory.
  • Distorting financial asset metrics to hide impairment problems. Tricks include (i) changing the presentation of key metrics (delinquency rates, non performing loans, loan loss reserves) and (ii) ceasing to disclose important metrics.
  • Distorting debt metrics to hide liquidity problems and ensure compliance with covenants.

Acquisition accounting shenanigans

Acquisition failures

Acquisitions tend to fail to live up to expectations for various reasons, including;

  • Widespread confidence in the magic of synergies.
  • Reckless transactions motivated by intense greed or fear.
  • Deals driven by artificial accounting and reporting benefits rather than business logic.

Manipulation tricks

Below are three types of acquisition accounting shenanigans:

Artificially boosting revenue and earnings

  • Tricks at a target company before a deal closes. The goal is to depress earnings in the period just before the deal (“stub period”). Watch for a slowdown in revenue prior to the acquisition, unusual sources of revenue at the time of an acquisition, large expense write-off during the stub period.
  • Hiding losses at deal closing. The goal is to make problems (e.g. money-losing investments) fly away by overpaying for acquisitions.
  • Creating dubious revenue streams after closing. Buyers and sellers have great flexibility in structuring a deal to create dubious future revenue streams, e.g. agreement to buy back product above market prices in exchange for a lower acquisition price.
  • Releasing suspicious reserves before or just after closing. The acquirer can (i) setup bigger than necessary earn-out reserves and release them into earnings later, (ii) take a charge for layoffs or projected legal payments and release them later.

Inflating reported cash flow

  • Inheriting operating inflows in a normal business acquisition, e.g. by selling inventory or collecting receivables of the target (while payments for the acquisitions did not show up in CFFO) or worse, artificially delaying collection of receivables or artificially anticipating payments to vendors before the transaction. When a company grows organically, it incurs CFFO outflows (payments for creating and marketing products) to create CFFO inflows. A company that grows through acquisitions would classify the WCR acquired in CFFI, thus inflating CFFO. Use CFFO minus capex minus cash paid for acquisitions when analyzing serial acquirers and review the balance sheet of acquired companies.
  • Acquiring contracts or customers rather than developing them internally, and presenting the related cost as an investing outflow.
  • Boosting CFFO by creatively structuring the sale of a business, e.g. recording proceeds from the sale of a business in CFFO as an advance on future revenue (increase in deferred revenue), or stripping out receivables prior to the sale so their collection can appear in CFFO.

Manipulating key metrics

  • Inflating sales growth at the core business. Tricks include (i) the use of strange definitions of organic or proforma sales growth, (ii) changes to the scope of comparable stores, (iii) acquisitions of a competitor where some of the target’s products are discontinued. Figure out the underlying growth of the legacy business, the acquired business and the combined business.
  • Highlighting inflated earnings. Watch for serial acquirers (i) that classify substantial deal-related costs or write-offs below the line, (ii) whose non-GAAP metrics always look far better than the GAAP equivalent.

The forensic mindset

  1. Skepticism is a competitive advantage. Corporate issuers and sell-side firms are incentivized to spread good news, which can create bubbles.
  2. Pay close attention to changes: always ask why and why now. Managers often come up with reassuring reasons for changes in accounting practices, financial trends, executive departures, auditors. Even more insightful than asking why is asking why now.
  3. Look past accounting problems to see if business problems are being covered up.
  4. Pay attention to corporate culture and watch for breeding grounds of bad behavior.
  5. Never blindly adopt the company’s profitability framework. Consider what question the non-GAAP measure answers, and whether the question itself is a worthwhile one.
  6. Incentives matter: pay close attention to how executives are compensated. Targets will shape management’s strategy.
  7. Even in financial disclosures: location, location, location. Read filings in their entirety.
  8. Like in golf, every shot counts. Companies encouraging investors to ignore certain expenses are asking for a free shot.
  9. Patterns of behavior provide a reliable signal.
  10. Be humble and curious, and never stop learning.

I hope you have enjoyed this article. To support this blog, remember to order your copy of Howard Schilit’s book using the links below.

Financial Shenanigans



2 responses to “Financial Statements – How To Detect A Fraud”

  1. […] less systematic than Financial Shenanigans, it is nevertheless an instructive […]

  2. […] less systematic than Financial Shenanigans, it is nevertheless an instructive […]

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